# Fungibility: Attacks and Solutions

Scaling Bitcoin Milan
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#### Why Fungibility?


- Bitcoin, like cash is immediate and final payment
  - Fungibility practices have gotten so bad, that with some wallets, that it is worse than paypal.
  - Paypal does not freeze your funds if one of your customers' customers used silkroad!
- Everyone needs fungibility, or no one has it.
  - Your lack of fungibility impacts everyone else.
- Bitcoin's permissionlessness is critical to its users
  - For bitcoin to function for payment we need fungibility
  - o If fungibility breaks down, merchants may start to consult blacklist services
  - o Taint tracing services become permission brokers. No permission, no bitcoin :(
- Worst case fungibility collapse can lead to loss of confidence, price crash.

#### Types of Attacks


- Modern Attacks do backwards looking analysis
  - o who received this, looking back up to 4 hops?
- Primarily Focused on Grouping Transactions/UTXOs from one Individual/Group by:
  - Transaction Flow Graph Analysis
    - Single-owner Inputs/Outputs, Address Reuse and Lack of Balance Privacy make this possible
  - Network Transaction Origin Identification Where did the transaction come from
  - Transaction Features Identification wallet/service fingerprinting
  - Transaction Censorship

## Scalability

Often fungibility solutions help scalability



Sometimes fungibility solutions are massive scalability wins



## Transaction Graph Privacy: Address Reuse

- Don't Do It!
- Stealth Addresses and HD-style derivation

#### Transaction Graph Privacy: Input/Output Privacy

- CoinJoin
  - TumbleBit
- Lightning (with Onion Routing, even!)
- Ring Signatures (Monero)
- One Way Aggregatable Signatures
- ZCash
- MimbleWimble

## Transaction Graph Privacy: Balance Privacy

- Balance Discretization
- Confidential Transactions



ZCash

#### **Network Attacks**

- BIP 37 (SPV Bloom Filters) largely gives up all privacy
  - Committed Bloom Filters may be a solution
- Connect-To-Everyone Attacks are common
  - Private Transaction Relay is hard lots of changes recently to improve this
- Essentially no privacy against global passive adversaries (aka NSA)
- There is lots of research into how to do this better using mixnets

# Transaction Features Identification (Wallet/Service Fingerprinting)

- Coin Selection
  - Change value
  - Reveal which UTXOs are in the same wallet
  - Fee selection
- Scripts Used
  - Schnorr fixes this for some types of multisig
  - MAST with hidden branches
  - zkSNARK-based script systems
- Non-Script Transaction Features

#### **Transaction Censorship**

- Coins which are censored even by a small hashrate are less valuable
- Create a social cost to Transaction Censorship
- Push Transaction Selection away from pools
- Encrypted Transactions

#### Conclusions

- Second-Layer solutions are incredibly powerful here: not everyone sees everything
- Better scaling helps fungibility (in many ways, sometimes just because there are more users)
- Much work to do but many ways forward